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STOP AND FRISK: AN HISTORICAL ANSWER TO A MODERN PROBLEM
LOREN G. STERN
Although stop and frisk legislation has only recently become a subject of national concern and
debate, the police power to detain and question is
as old as the common law of England. Detention
and questioning were well known to, and strongly
enforced under, the English common law. Early
case holdings and statutes empowered the nightwatch of each town to detain "suspicious nightwalkers" until the morning at which time the
watchman would either release the suspect or
1
arrest him if grounds for arrest were discovered.
Even private individuals were authorized to detain
suspicious night-walkers until they gave a proper
account of themselves.2 In 1839 the English Parliament extended the common law power to detain by
authorizing police to search any vessel, carriage,
and persons who could be reasonably suspected of
1
possessing stolen goods.
of the United States
courts
of
state
A number
have followed the English common law and, in the
absence of statutory provisions, have upheld the
power of police officers to stop, question, and frisk
suspects under reasonable circumstances. These
courts have found that the police have a duty to
stop and to question under circumstances "which

I HALE, PLEAS OF TEE CRowN 88,97 (Wilson ed. 1800);
2 HAWKINS, PLEAS or =an CROWN 164, 173 (7th ed.
1795).

22 HAwKmNs, PLEAs OF T~m CROWN 129 (8th ed. 1824).
3W Iams, Police Detention and Arrest Privileges-

England. 51 L CRrm. L.. C. & P.S. 413, 418 (1960).

reasonably require investigation and to frisk as
incident to inquiry." 4 This power to detain is
based upon a standard which is less than probable
cause-a standard of reasonable suspicion, much
like the one prescribed by the English Parliament.
The reasonableness of any detention and investigation is determined as a question of constitutional
fact under the circumstances of each individual
case.

5

4See People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P. 2d 52
(1956); People v. Ambrose, 155 Cal. App. 2d 513, 318 P.
2d 181 (1957); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y. 2d 441, 201 N.
E. 2d 32 (1964); People v. Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467, 235
N.Y.S. 2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1962); State v. Chronister, 353 P.
2d 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); Hargus v. State, 58 Okla.
Crim. 301, 54 P. 2d 211 (1935); United States v. Bonanno.
180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); State v. Hatfield, 112
W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932); State v. Zupan, 155
Wash. 80, 283 Pac. 671 (1929); State v. Cantrell, 310
S.W. 2d 866, (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958); People v. Henneman,

367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E. 2d 649 (1937); People v. Exum,
204, 47 N.E. 2d 56 (1943); State v. Kilday,
382 Ill.
155 A.2d 336 (R.I. 1959); State v. Gluczynski, 32 Del.
120, 120 At. 88 (1922); City of Portland v. Goodwin,

187 Ore. 409, 427, 210 P. 2d 577, 585 (1949); Gisske v.
Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (1908).
SSee, e.g., United States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524
(2nd Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962). Fifteen months after a bank robbery which Vita committed F.B.I. agents asked him to come to F.B.I.
headquarters. Vita agreed and was not taken to headquarters against his will. He was told that he was

not under arrest, was free to go at anytime, and that
anything he said could be used against him. Vita consented to fingerprinting, a lie detector test, and to participating in two line-ups. After six hours he confessed
to the robbery. Vita claimed that his confession was

STOP AND FRISK: AN HISTORICAL ANSWER

Although only five state legislatures have felt
the necessity to pass stop and frisk legislation,
many state legislatures have otherwise given the
police authority to detain suspicious persons by
enacting vagrancy statutes authorizing the arrest
of any person suspiciously loitering. These
vagrancy statutes are not as broad as stop and
frisk statutes, yet these statutes can often encompass the situation where a detention would be
called for.
In the last few years, law enforcement agencies
have consistently sought the enactment of stop
and frisk legislation, partially, at least, in response
to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Mapp v. Ohio.7 Before the Mapp decision, one-half of the state courts, including
New York, allowed incriminating evidence to be
admitted at trial even though it was seized incident to an unlawful arrest. But the New York
decisions left some doubt whether an officer could
detain a suspect for questioning if he did not
made during an unnecessary delay before being brought
in front of a commissioner.
The court held that a reasonable detention is not
necessarily a short one.
It is at such a time [during questioning when the
suspect responds with explanations or denials]
that law enforcement agents must work with
all possible speed to verify that [the suspect]
says and run down leads which develop in the
process. This takes time. The question of when 5A
is violated is decided on the facts of each case. The
policy of reasonableness indicates that arrest should
not include all detention. If there is justification for
delay then the delay is not unnecessary. The detention is not an arrest nor unnecessary if the continuing process of essential investigation is being
carried out expeditiously, the suspect has been advised of his constitutional rights, and there is no reason to believe that the procedures being followed
are used merely as an excuse for delay during which
a confession can be extracted.
6 CAL. Px.N. CODE § 647. Every person who roams
about from place to place without any lawful business;
or Every person who wanders about the streets at late
or unusual hours of the night without any visible or
lawful business; or Every person who loiters, prowls or
wanders upon the private property of another, in the
nighttime, without any visible or lawful business with
the owner or occupant thereof; or who while loitering.
prowling or wandering upon the private property of
another, in the nighttime, peeks in the door or window
of any building or structure located thereon and which
is inhabited by human beings, without visible or lawful
business with the owner or occupant thereof: is a
vagrant and is punishable by fine of not exceeding S500
or by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or by both
such fine and imprisonment.
See Foote, Vagramy-Type Law and Its Administration,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956); Note, Use of VagramyType Laws for the Arrest and Detention of Suspiciouts
Persons, 59 YA.E L.J. 1351 (1950).

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

have an arrest warrant and there were no grounds
for arrest 3 Thus a police officer was never quite
sure whether a detention was constitutionally
valid. Police officials felt that the mandatory
exclusionary rule of Mapp, when congidered with
antiquated arrest statutes and the diverse state
court holdings on the power to detain, improperly
restricted effective police action. The police demanded that the legislature pass a stop and frisk
statute which would permit a policeman to detain
and frisk a suspect on the grounds of reasonable
suspicion, thereby eliminating the necessity of
grounds for arrest.9 These officials believed that
the New York legislature had precedent for enacting a stop and frisk statute. Other states on
the Eastern Seaboard had enacted stop and frisk
statutes even before the Mapp decision. The
legislatures of these states, knowing that police
may often wish to investigate without having to
bring the suspect to the station house for booking
and arraignment, passed legislation providing a
category of permissible restraint other than arrest
and thus allowed police a greater flexibility in
their investigations and in the performance of
their duties.10
s Cases holding that police cannot detain suspects
where grounds for arrest do not exist; People v. Tinston,
6 Misc. 2d 485, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 554 (Magis. Ct. 1957);
Arnold v. State, 255 App. Div. 422, 425, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 28.
30 (3d Dept. 1938), rev'd on other gronds, 280 N.Y. 326,

20 N.E. 2d 774 (1939). Contra; People v. Entrialgo, 19
App. Div. 2d 509, 245 N.Y.S. 2d 850 (2d Dept. 1963),
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y. 2d 733, 199 N.E. 2d 384, 250 N.Y.S.
2d9 293 (1964).
Memorandum of the New York State Combined
Council of Law Enforcement Officials to the New York
State Legislature In Relation to Temporary Questioning
and Search for Weapons, 38 ST. Jons L. REv. 392,
4000 (1964).
1 Text, Interstate Commission on Crime, Interstate
Crime Control 86-89 (1942).
Section 2: Questioning and Detaining Suspects.
(1) A peace officer may stop any person who he has
reasonable grounds to suspect is committing,
has committed or is about to commit a crime,
and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify
himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction
of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by
this section shall not exceed two hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded
as an arrest in any official record. At the end of
the detention the person so detained shall be
released or be arrested and charged with a crime.
Section 3: Searching for Weapons. Persons Who
Have Not Been Arrested.
A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon
any person whom he has stopped or detained to
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and frisk statutes may be good indicators of
whether the Supreme Court will hold these statutes
constitutional.
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
all searches and seizures; it prohibits only those
which are unreasonable. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that in order for an arrest to
be reasonable, it must be based upon probable
cause. 5 The Court has defined probable cause
as existing when "the facts and circumstances
within [the arresting officer's] knowledge and of
which [he] has reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that [an offense has been or is
being committed]." The Court must "deal with
probabilities ...they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which prudent
12
person."
7
... act.
Stop and frisk statutes present the judiciary men
It is true that both an arrest and a stop are
with a problem which has confronted them before
"seizures" within the meaning of the constitution,
the
-the problem of balancing. In determining
ends and the
constitutionality of the stop and frisk statutes, but that is where the similarity
of absolute
restriction
every
Not
begin.
differences
the courts must balance the right of a citizen
action
police
illegal
an
is
movement
of
freedom
to move freely about without any undue restraint
8
Also, not
evidence.'
of
suppression
demanding
and
agencies,
enforcement
law
or interference by
every detention is an arrest.9 An arrest-a formal
his right to liberty and privacy, against society's
leads to arraignment, bookneed to maintain order by the prevention of apprehension-which
usually, though not necesis
trial
public
and
ing,
crime and the ability to bring criminals to justice
3
form of seizure." The stop
gravest
the
sarily,
Supreme
no
are
There
efficiently.1
and
quickly
authorized by stop and frisk statutes, contrasted
Court decisions dealing with the constitutionality
4
"is relatively short, less conspicuof stop and frisk statutes, but the holdings of with an arrest,
to the person stopped,
humiliating
less
and
ous
issues
federal courts on other constitutional
of police coercion." 21
chance
less
much
closely related to those presented by the stop and offers
There are no charges made against the suspect
question as provided in Section 2, whenever he has
and, usually, no record made of the stop.
reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if
The distinction between an arrest and a detenthe person possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer finds a weapon, he may take and keep it until
tion has been recognized by English jurists and
the completion of the questioning, when he shall
legislatures for hundreds of years. The English
either return it or arrest the person. The arrest may
common law made a clear distinction between
be for the illegal possession of the weapon.
"The New York statute is more limited than the an arrest and a detention. By statute and case
Uniform Arrest Act since the New York statute is
limited only to felonies and serious misdemeanors while holdings, the night-watch could detain a suspicious
night-walker "and if no suspicion be found, he
the Uniform Arrest Act encompasses any crime.
12 N.Y. CODE C1IM. PRO. § 180-a(2).
's Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924). The
11Carroll v. United States, supra n. 13; Brinegar v.
right of liberty, privacy and the right to move freely
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v.
about without undue interference is a natural right of United
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Ker v. California, 374
all United States citizens. These rights are guaranteed U.S. 23 (1963).
to all citizens under Amendment IX of the Constitution
1"Carroll v. United States, supra n. 13.
and under the "due process" clause of the XIV Amend17Brinegar v. United States, supra n. 15.
ment. CoRwIN, UNDERSTAN' ING THE CONSTITUTION,
18United States v. Bonanno, supra n. 4.
104, 117, 118 (1949).
19 United States v. Vita, supra n. 5.
'4 "he issue will be decided in the 1967-68 Term. See
0Although all arrests are not absolutely graver than
Peters v. New York, 18 N.Y. 2d 238, 219 N.E. 2d 595, a detention, those arrests which go to the station house
prob. juris. noted, 386 U.S. 980 (1967); Sibron v. New or to court are graver than any detention.
York, 18 N.Y. 2d 603, 219 N.E. 2d 196 (1966), prob.
2"LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police:
juris. noted, 386 U.S. 954 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 5 Ohio
An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WAsH. U. L.Q.
App. 2d 122, 214 N.E. 2d 114 (1966), cert. granted, 387 331, 356-60.
U.S. 929 (1967).

Thus in 1964, urged by the police officials and
encouraged by its neighbors' legislative actions,
New York enacted a stop and frisk statute derived from, similar to, but more limited than the
Uniform Arrest Act." In the state of New York an
officer may stop and question any person "abroad
in a public place" whom the officer "reasonably
suspects has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a felony or serious misdemeanor."
If the officer "reasonably suspects" that he is in
danger, he may search for dangerous weapons
on the suspect's person. If he finds a weapon or
"any other thing, the possession of which may
constitute a crime," the officer can keep it until
the end of the questioning "at which time he
shall return it if lawfully possessed or arrest such
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of New Jersey in July, 1967. A veteran member
of the New Brunswick Police Department was
patrolling a low income, high crime rate section
of the city at 3 a.m. The officer had worked in
ground for suspicion was not the equivalent of
probable cause. If, during the detention, grounds this area for over fifteen years and was familiar
for arrest (probable cause) were found, the night- with the people there. He noticed the defendant
watch was to arrest the suspect21 Thus, it is and another man, both strangers to him, walking
apparent that the English common law permitted and constantly turning their heads to look behind
detention without an arraignment on grounds them. These men went to a municipal parking
less than probable cause while requiring probable lot and were standing between two autos when
they noticed the officer observing them. The two
cause for an arrest.
men turned and left the parking lot. The officer
Even where stop and frisk legislation has not
stopped them, got out of the patrol car and asked
have
courts
of
the
state
been enacted, one-fifth
them what they were doing in the lot. The reply
consistently distinguished between detention and
was "Nothing". The officer told the two men
an arrest. These state courts have held that police
that they were under arrest and gave defendant
officers have a right to stop and question suspectsDilley a "quick frisk" by patting him on the outaction
this
action-without
investigatory
to take
side of his jacket. He felt a pistol which he imconstituting an arrest.2 These courts hold that
mediately removed and discovered it to be a
a detention is not an arrest if the detention is for
loaded .38 caliber revolver. The other man was
a reasonable length of time. In determining what
also found to be armed.
is a reasonable length of time, the courts look
Both men were convicted of carrying a conto the circumstances of each case.
cealed weapon, but only Dilley appealed his
The most recent example of this rationale is
26
conviction. The trial court had denied Dilley's
decided by the Supreme Court
State v. Dill,,
motion to suppress the revolver as illegally seized
v 2 HAwxKus, PLEAS OF THE CROwN, supra n. 2.
because (1) there was a valid arrest and an in23Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6
(1810). In this case the suspect was passing through the cidental taking of the gun and, in the alternative,
streets at 11:00 at night with a bundle in his possession.
(2) there was a lawful right to question Dilley
He was stopped by the night-watchman and taken to
incidentally frisk him for the officer's protecand
the watch-house where he was questioned as to what was
tion.
in the bundle and who had given it to him. His reply
was that he did not know what was in the bundle, but
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed
that he was carrying it to his sister's house. The suspect referred the watchman to an address where the Diley's conviction holding that the arrest and
watchman could inquire for proof of his veracity. No incidental taking of the weapon were lawful.
inquiry was made and the suspect was held in jail until
"However, we need not pursue this issue for we
morning when he was released. This detention was valid,
are satisfied that the trial court's alternative
the court holding that "watchmen ...have authority at
common law to arrest and detain in prison for examinaground for denial of the motion represented a
tion, persons walking in the streets at night, whom there
is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although there sound approach to the important constitutional
and enforcement problems presented and should
is no proof of a felony having been committed." Queen
v. Tooley, 2 LD Raym 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (KB
be reaffirmed here." The court then declared
1709). Here a statute was passed authorizing constables
that police officers' duties include "vital preventive
to arrest all disorderly persons (street-walkers). A constable arrested a woman whom he suspected of being a roles;" that they must have the right to stop
street-walker. His suspicion was due to the fact that
persons on the street for summary inquiry where
once before he had arrested her for being a street walker.
The court held that constables may seize suspicious per- the circumstances are so suspicious as to call for
sons, but it must be a "just ground of suspicion." It
inquiry. The court declared that the temporary
is not a constable's suspecting that will justify his taking
detention which is incidental to summary inquiry
up of a person, but it must be just grounds of suspicion
...the will of the constable cannot rule-the liberty of is not a formal arrest requiring probable cause
the suspect cannot depend upon the will of the constable."
and that the legality of the inquiry cannot deHere the constable did not have a reasonable ground for
pend on what label the street detention is given,
suspicion. The woman had done nothing to arouse any
suspicion. The constable's only basis for suspecting the "but rather on whether it was reasonable in the
woman of being a street-walker was his past experience
light of the circumstances .... In determining
with her and this was not a sufficient basis for suspicion.
242 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CRowx, supra n. 1.
reasonableness, weight must of course be given
25See cases cited in n. 4, supra.
to all of the pertinent factors including the basis
26-J.-(1967).
shall go quit." ' The basis for detention was not
a "mere causeless suspicion" or hunch; the basis
was a "'just ground for suspicion." 2 This just

LOREN G. STERN

of the suspicion on the part of the police and the
nature and extent of the restraint on the individual.
Where, as here, the circumstances disclosed highly
suspicious activities at three in the morning on
the city streets and in the city parking lot, the
inquiry was not only reasonably called for, but
was actually dictated by elemental police responsiblities."
The court went on to hold that the frisk was
obviously a greater intrusion on privacy than the
detention. "But here again the formal labeling
of the action should not be controlling and the
test should be its reasonableness in the totality
of the circumstances." Therefore, the right to
frisk necessarily exists when the circumstances
point to the need of such action for the officer's
protection. In this case the officer was alone,
confronted by two men in the early morning
hours, didn't know what these men were carrying,
and felt that there was a good possibility that he
could have been killed by one of them. Thus,
his frisk was for self-protection.
The distinctions between an arrest and a detention are clearly pointed out and emphasized
by the stop and frisk statutes. The Uniform Arrest
Act provides for a new category of detention
in the course of an investigation which is not an
arrest. The detention is just a "street stop"
which may occur at any place and at any time
in order for a short, superficial investigation of the
suspect. The New York statute authorizes a
"stopping for temporary questioning" only and
not an arrest. The courts of those states having
stop and frisk statutes have consistently upheld
the validity of the legislatures' distinction between
2 9

an arrest and a detention.

In defining probable cause the Supreme Court
has balanced the individual's interests against
27Uniform
2

Arrest Act § 2(3).

N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 180-a(1): A police officer

may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he
reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is
about to commit a felony or any of the crimes specified
in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter (serious
misdemeanors), and may demand his name, address and
explanation of his actions.
29 Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 174 A. 2d 560 (R.I. 1960);
DeSalvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A. 2d 244 (1960);
Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A. 2d 108 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E. 2d 840 (1964)
(dictum). People v. Mercado, 262 S. 2d 641 (1965);
People v. Koposesky, 269 S. 2d 486 (1966); People v.
Rodriguz 262 S.2d 863 (1965). Other states have passed
statutes which are similar to the Uniform Arrest Act and
which distinguish between an arrest and a detentionCAL. PEx. CODE 833 (1957); Wis. STAT. 954.03 (1961);
Mo. REv. STAT. 84.090, 84.440 (1959).
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those of society. The Court has held that an arrest, the highest degree of seizure, requires probable cause in order to be reasonable under the
mandate of the Fourth Amendment. 0 A court
determines if there was probable cause for the
arrest by looking at the circumstances of each
case and deciding whether the officer's belief
was reasonable under the particular circumstances.
Probable cause is the officer's reasonable beliefthe probability under the circumstances. The
basis for detention under the stop and frisk statutes is reasonable suspiciozn-the possibility under
the circumstances. By definition suspicion is just
3
one step removed from belief. '
At this point we must note that the Court has
never held that an arrest or seizure occurs at the
first instant of restraint upon the suspect. - Other
federal courts have recognized a distinction between arrest and detention.n Since a detention is
a much lesser degree of seizure than an arrest,
a detention should require a lesser degree of
justification than does an arrest.34 Suspicion is
this lesser degree. If the courts find that an officer's
suspicion was reasonable under the circumstances,
then this standard for detention certainly seems
to meet the Fourth Amendment requirement of
reasonableness. The Supreme Court has declared
that it is "not unmindful" of the needs of society
for efficient law enforcement. 3 If so, it must per-

mit the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness to reflect the difference between a detention
for a brief investigation and a formal arrest.
11Carroll v. United States, supra n. 13; United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Brinegar v. United
States, supra n. 15; Ker v. California, supran. 15.
31Leagre, 54 J. CiRu. L., C. A.D P.S. 393, 412 (1963);
Kuh, 56 J. Can. L., C. A.uLDP.S. 32 (1965); Kavanagh v.
Stenhouse, supra n. 29.
1 Schoenfeld, 17 SYR. L. REv. 627, 639 (1966).
1 United States v. Vita, supra n. 5; United States v.
Bonanno, supra n. 4.
-"Support for this author's opinion that a variable
probable cause is the test which must be used in determining the reasonableness of any restraint on a suspect
can be found in SCHAEFER, THE SusPEcT Ain SocrETY
25 (1967). "It seems to me more relevant to ask whether
there is probable cause for restraining the suspect than
to ask whether there is probable cause for believing in
the suspect's guilt. The Fourth Amendment does not, I
submit, preclude us from weighing the extent of the detention against the strength of the evidence that justifies it." Justice Schaefer goes on to say, "[t]he argument
based on reasonableness is a strong one." Justice Schaefer
would like the test of reasonableness of a police officer's
conduct to be stated in terms of "what the reaction
would be if he had not done what he is charged with
having done wrongfully. If you would fire the officer
for not doing what he did, then what he did was reasonable." Id. p. 41.
15Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).

STOP AND FRISK: AN HISTORICAL ANSW.ER

Although the Supreme Court has not yet had
the opportunity to use the balancing of interests
approach in the area of temporary detention,
it has been employed in other cases dealing with
the Fourth Amendment.
The case of Frank v. Maryland,16 and the cases
of Camara v. Municipal Cour 37 and See v. Cily of
Seatlc,8 which overruled Frank, (to the extent
that although a warrant is required for administrative searches of homes and businesses not
open to the public, the degree of probable cause
necessary for such a search warrant to issue is
less than ordinarily required in warrant cases),
are important precedents in the area of temporary
detention for two reasons.
[These cases] illustrate the willingness of the
Court to recognize that the traditional protection of the Fourth Amendment may be
flexibly interpreted when faced with a high
degree of public interest, and [they] show that
the Court considers itself capable of weighing
various factors and balancing interests in
order to conclude whether a governmental
invasion of privacy was or was not reasonable.
The only distinction between this and the right
of temporary detention is the element of criminal procedure; a greater risk is involved
when the restraint is a preliminary step in
the process which may ultimately lead to
trial and conviction. Admittedly the danger
to the security of the individual is greater
under such circumstances. Yet it is not contended that this increased risk is to be treated
as irrelevant; its consideration is necessarily
inherent in the nature of the balancing test
involved. Experience in other areas of the law
shows that the element of risk can be weighed
along with the value of the interests protected3
and the social need for the conduct pursued. 3
36359 U.S. 360 (1959).
37
87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967).
2Leagre, supra n. 31 at 414. Frank v. 'Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959). A Baltimore City health inspector was
investigating the exterior and surrounding area of
Frank's home for the source of a rat infestation. The
inspector discovered evidence of such an infestation in
the rear of Frank's home. The inspector did not have a
warrant to search, but he requested Frank to allow him
to inspect Frank's home. Frank refused this request and
was arrested the next day for violating § 120 Art. 12 of
the Baltimore City Code. Frank was convicted and appealed to the Supreme Court alleging that his arrest and
conviction for resisting inspection without a warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court affirmed the
conviction holding that "[iln light of the long history of
this kind of inspection and of modem needs, we cannot

When the Court has the opportunity to apply
the balancing of interests approach to the stop
and frisk statutes, it appears that it has ample
precedent for deciding that a detention under
the stop and frisk statutes does not violate the
prohibition of unreasonableness of the Fourth
Amendment and it should not interpret the
statutes as so doing.
Deciding that detention on less than probable
cause for arrest may be reasonable, however,
answers only half the problem. There remains
the question of the validity of the incidental
search or "frisk". The courts which have upheld
the validity of the search of a suspect incident
to a stop have done so on the basis that a search
for dangerous weapons is really only a "frisk."
The argument for upholding the frisk as constitutional usually is stated as follows. just as a
detention is different than an arrest, so, too, is
the frisk which is incidental to a detention different than a search. The frisk is of a limited scope;
"just a mere patting of the outer clothing" while a
search is a thorough investigation of the suspect's
person. 0 The right to frisk does not automatically
follow after every lawful detention. The officer
is only authorized to frisk a suspect when the
officer reasonably suspects that the suspect possesses a weapon which may be used to harm him.
The frisk is a precaution which contributes considerably to the basic safety of the officer. The
state courts which have decided cases dealing
with the stop and frisk statutes have held that a
frisk, as a safety precaution, is constitutional.a
Even in the absence of stop and frisk statutes,
state courts have upheld the right of an officer
42
to frisk a detained suspect as a safety precaution.
say that the carefully circumscribed demand which
Maryland here makes on appellant's freedom has deprived him of due process of law."
40People v. Rivera, supra n. 4.
41
Under the circumstances presented in each case the
courts held that a frisk was not so unreasonable as to
be constitutionally forbidden. People v. Rodriguz, supra
n. 4; People v. Cassese, 263, S.2d 737 (1965); Commonwealth v. Lehan, supran. 29; People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.
2d 65 (1965). In these cases it appears that the courts
realize the necessity for the detaining officer to protect
himself by a frisk of the suspect. If the circumstances
reflect that the officer may have reasonably suspected
the suspect of carrying a dangerous weapon, then the
officer's act of frisking was reasonable and did not fall
under the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonsearches and seizures.
able
42
See note 4; Ellis v. United States, 264 F. 2d 372
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 4 Pa. D. & C. 262 (Quarter Session
1923); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal 2d 448, 380 P. 2d
658 (1963) (diclum); People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645,
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And even some opponents of the stop and frisk
statutes admit that a frisk is necessary and constitutionally
permissible when used as a safety
3
measure.

4

The right to frisk, when used as a safety measure, after a lawful detention therefore parallels
the right to search after a lawful arrest. Just as a
detention requires a lesser degree of justification
than an arrest, so, too, does a frisk require a
lesser degree of justification than a full blown
search. Because a frisk does not interfere with,
restrict, or inconvenience a person to nearly as
great a degree as does a search, a lesser grounds
for justifying a frisk may still meet the Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness.
The argument that only a lesser form of search,
i.e., a "frisk", may reasonably accompany a lesser
290 P. 2d 531 (1955) (dictum). But see, White v. United
States, 271 F. 2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
In Ellis v. United States, the arresting officers were

specially assigned to look for the perpetrator of a number of day-time housebreakings in a certain area of
Northeast Washington D.C. They had the housebreakers description. The officers saw a man that fit the
description roaming about the area checking homes to
see if anyone was home. The officers stopped the suspect and asked him twice to take his hand out of his
pocket which he refused to do. The pocket had a bulge
in it which could have been caused by a gun. The officers
frisked him and found items (not a gun) which were used
as evidence against the suspect.
In People v. Rivera, three New York detectives in
plain clothes and an unmarked car were patrolling an
area with a high incidence of crime at 1:30 in the morning. The detectives observed two men walk up to the
front of a bar and grill, stop, and look inside for about
five minutes. The two men then' began to walk away,
stopped, came back and looked in the window again.
Upon noticing the detectives car, the men began to walk
away quickly. They were stopped and frisked. The
frisk uncovered a loaded .22 caliber revolver. The New
York Court of Appeals held that despite the absence
of probable cause for believing a crime is being committed or has been committed, neither state nor federal
law prohibits police from stopping and frisking a suspicious person. The court spoke of a bullet being the
answer to the officer's questions. "The frisk is a reasonable and constitutionally permissible precaution to
minimize that danger." Supra p. 446, 201 N.E. 2d at 35.
In People v. Salerno, the arresting officers noticed the
suspect walking down the street at 3:15 in the morning
carrying a gun case. When asked what he was doing,
the suspect answered that he was going duck hunting.
The officers replied that there was no duck season in
July. The suspect then said that he was going to hunt
chipmunks. The officers asked to see the gun. It was a
fully loaded shot gun. The officers told the suspect that
he would have to come down to the station and gave the
suspect a quick frisk before he entered the car. The
frisk uncovered a hard object the size of a pistol. A more
formal search revealed a pistol and two hunting knives.
The Supreme Court of New York upheld the frisk as
reasonable under the circumstnaces.
43 Schoenfeld, supra n, 32; 78 HARv. L. REv. 473 (1964).
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form of arrest, i.e., a detention, concedes too much,
however, and unnecessarily so. For the danger
that a suspect may be carrying a weapon and
may use it to escape from the police officer is
exactly the same whether an officer arrests a
suspect or merely stops him. Since the danger is
equally as great in either situation, and since a
search is reasonable if it is incident to an arrest,
a search for dangerous weapons should be reasonable as an incident to the detention.
Although the statutes are labeled stop and
frisk, they authorize a search for dangerous
weapons. The majority of courts which have
dealt with these statutes have interpreted this
search to mean a frisk."4 There seems to be no
basis for this interpretation and no need to label
a search a frisk. The detaining officer has a right
to protect himself from injury by the suspect.
If the officer reasonably suspects that the suspect
has a dangerous weapon and may possibly use it
on the officer, the officer's only protection is a
search to uncover this weapon before it is used.
This search must be as extensive as necessary
in order to find the weapon and to assure the officer
that he is in no danger. Therefore, a search which
is incident to a valid stop and which is made as a
safety precaution is reasonable under the circumstances and does not violate the Fourth Amendment -prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Since the courts have consistently labeled the
search conducted by officers before the stop and
frisk statutes were enacted, and the search authorized by these statutes, as a frisk, it seems
likely that both state and federal courts will be
exceedingly hesitant to free themselves of the
shackles of this precedent.45 The courts seem to
be looking for some method to allow a search
based on something less than probable cause.
The courts do this by labeling the search a frisk
instead of breaking away from the precedents
which make all reasonable searches those which
are based on probable cause. The Fourth Amendment speaks only of unreasonable searches and
seizures. There is no reason why a search cannot
be based on something less than probable cause
and still be a reasonable one. 46 The courts have

4"See
note 41.
4
1 See notes 41 and 42.
46
SCHAEFE, supra n. 34, at p. 42. Justice Schaefer is
of the opinion that a search for dangerous weapons
which may be used against the detaining officer is a
reasonable search and meets the requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. See n. 34.
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not as yet adopted this viewpoint, and hold that
a search must be based on probable cause in order
to be constitutionally valid.
There is no reason, however, why an officer's
suspicion cannot be elevated to belief when the
suspect offers unsatisfactory explanations to the
officer's questions.a Nor is there any reason why
a frisk based upon a reasonable suspicion-and
engaged in by the officer as a safety precautioncannot, under some circumstances, become a
constitutionally valid search for evidence when
the officer's reasonable suspicion is raised to
probable cause on the discovery of a weapon. The
weapon discovered during the frisk can be admitted as evidence against the suspect since the
frisk, as a safety measure, was certainly not unreasonable under the circumstances. And after
discovery of a weapon a further, more thorough
search for evidence may be permissible because
the officer's suspicion that the suspect was carrying a dangerous weapon has been elevated to
belief by his discovery. Therefore, the later fruits
of the search are also admissible as evidence
against the suspect because these fruits were
discovered by a search based upon probable cause.
To illustrate, suppose an upper middle class
neighborhood whose residents are all white which
has been the scene of many late night robberies
in the last few weeks. The victims of the robberies
have described the robber as either a Mexican
or Puerto Rican male, whose height is -about five
feet seven inches and whose weight is about one
hundred and thirty-five pounds. All the robberies
have been committed with the use of a pistol.
An officer notices a Puerto Rican male who fits
the robber's description and who seems to be
just roaming around the area at one o'clock in
the morning. The officer stops him and asks him
what he is doing in this neighborhood at this late
hour. The suspect's explanations are clearly unsatisfactory and the officer, suspecting that this
person may be responsible for the many robberies
in this area, and suspecting that this person may
be carrying a gun with which to commit a robbery, and fearing that he might use this gun. in
order to escape arrest, proceeds to frisk the susa If the suspect refuses to answer, his refusal will not
contribute to any notion of probable cause. California
Police Training Bulletin #3 states that a suspect's refusal to answer shall not contribute to probable cause.
Neither detention statutes nor states without detention
statutes which allow temporary stopping and frisking
provide any penalties for a suspect's refusal to answer
questions.

pect. Upon frisking the suspect, the officer feels
a hard object about the size of a pistol in the
suspect's coat pocket. The officer looks into the
pocket and discovers a pistol.
At this moment the officer's suspicion may be
confirmed; he may now reasonably believe that
this man is the cause of the many robberies in
the neighborhood. Based on this belief, the officer
conducts a thorough search and discovers a few
watches and billfolds. The officer then arrests
the suspect for robbery. If the true owners of the
watches and billfolds are found and, in fact, the
suspect is identified as the robber, the suspect
will be tried. The billfolds and watches which
the officer discovered on the suspect can be admitted as evidence at the trial court. The original
detention gave adequate grounds for a frisk for
safety purposes which, in turn, confirmed the
officer's suspicion and elevated it to a belief which
meets the probable cause standard of reasonableness.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Due process means that
there must be an ascertainable standard by which
the law is made clear to any reasonable man,
relieving him of the burden of guessing what the
law is.4 It has been argued that the stop and
frisk statutes violate the Fifth Amendment because of the vagueness of the term "temporary
questioning", the indefiniteness of the length of
time this "temporary questioning" can last, the
indefiniteness of the amount of force that an officer
can use to stop and question a suspect, and the
9
vagueness of the standard "reasonable suspicion".
"Temporary questioning" is just that; a brief
stop which will last no longer than it takes, for
example, for the suspect to give his name, his
address, and an explanation of his actions under
the N-ew York statute. Under the Uniform Arrest
Act the stop is also a brief one, taking no longer
than it takes the suspect to explain his actions
and the Act goes on to state that if the cursory
investigation does not dismiss the officer's suspicion, then a more thorough investigation is
authorized which may under no circumstances
last for more than two hours. Thus it appears
48CORWAM, UNDERSTA.NDDG

THE

CONSTuTTox

(1949).
4 The terms 'temporary questioning' and 'reasonable
suspicion' are used in the New York stop and frisk statute
'Reasonable grounds to suspect' is the term used in the
Uniform Arrest Act.
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that the term "temporary questioning" is not ableness of the suspicion will depend upon the
vague and that the length of time it can last is special situation in which the suspect and the
officer find themselves. This is a workable standclearly established by the statutes.
The stop and frisk statutes do not give an ard. It is used by the courts in determining probaofficer the right to use force in order to stop and ble cause and must be used in determining reasonable suspicion. As Professor Leagre so aptly states,
question a suspect. The statutes say absolutely
"the Court is capable of eliciting fundamental
nothing about the amount of force permissible,
standards through a process of judicial inclusion
but this fact does not violate the Fifth Amendmtnt.
When an officer asks a person to stop, most, if not
and exclusion.., a certain amount of vagueness
is rather of the essence of a Constitutional prinall, law-abiding citizens will do so out of respect
for the authority of the officer, if not the law. ciple." 51
Nor do the stop and frisk statutes violate the
When an officer asks a criminal to stop, most
criminals will stop. A criminal will stop even prohibition against self-incrimination embodied
though he has committed a crime, or is about to in the Fifth Amendment. These statutes do not
commit a crime, because he feels that he can answer compel a suspect to answer. A suspect cannot
be detained until he answers, the longest perquestions adequately enough to dispel the officer's suspicion. A criminal may often stop when missible detention under any statute being two
hours.52 And no statute provides any penalty
asked to do so because of the fear that his flight
may lend credence to the suspicion that he was for a suspect's refusal to answer the officer's
about to or has committed a crime. The criminal question. In Mirandav. State of Arizona, the Court
held that "[g]eneral on the scene questioning as
will often stop because of fear for his life; fear
to facts surrounding a crime or other general
that if he doesn't stop and begins to run, a bullet
may be used to stop him. Thus it seems that most questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process
good citizens and many criminals will stop when is not affected by our holding. It is an act of rean officer asks them to stop. If upon the order sponsible citizenship for individuals to give whatto stop a suspect begins to run away, the officer ever information they may have to aid in law
may have reasonable grounds to suspect that the enforcement. In such situations the compelling
suspect has committed some crime.50 At this atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
The
point the officer, as a law enforcer, has a duty to interrogation is not necessarily present."
apprehend the suspect for questioning using what- stop and frisk which takes place at the point of
ever force is necessary to accomplish this appre- the stop and restricts the suspect's freedom only to
hension. It is probable that an officer will not the amount of time it takes the suspect to give
have to use any force in stopping most people his name, his address, and an explanation of his
because they will stop when asked to stop while actions falls under the category of general quesin the few cases where force is necessary it will tioning in the fact-finding process.
Closely related to the prohibition against selfbe warranted.
Just as the framers of our Constitution failed incrimination is the Sixth Amendment mandate
to define probable cause, so, too, have the framers that "the accused shall have a right to counsel
of the stop and frisk statutes failed to define in all criminal prosecutions." The right to counsel
reasonable suspicion. The framers of the Con- has been extended through the years to the point
stitution left it to the courts to interpret the where a person's constitutional right to counsel
meaning of probable cause. The framers of the is mandatory when a custodial interrogation is
stop and frisk statutes have also left it to the conducted.M "By custodial we mean questioning
courts to define reasonable suspicion. Just as initiated by law enforcement officers after a per.probable cause is defined on the basis of all the son has been taken into custody or otherwise
facts of each case, so must the courts define reason- deprived of his freedom of action in any signifiable suspicion on the basis of all the facts and cant way." 15 In Miranda, the Court distinguished
circumstances of each case. In each case the reason51Leagre, supra n. 31, at 420.
0 Richardson v. State, 113 Ga. App. 163, 147 S.E.
-1 Uniform Arrest Act 2(3); see n. 10.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629 (1966).
2d 653 (1966); Robinson v. State, 93 Ga 77, 18 S.E.
54Miranda v. Arizona, supra n. 52.
1018 (1893): suspect's flight gives probable cause for
"5Miranda v. Arizona, supra n. 52, at 1612. The
arrest. But cf. Wong Sun et at. v. United States 371 U.S.
471 (1963); under certain circumstances a suspect's Court also held that "[tihe principles announced today
deal with the protection which must be given to the
flight is equivocable.
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between a custodial and a non-custodial interrogation, the latter being permissible without any
warning to the suspect of his right to counsel
and without any constitutional right to counsel
attaching at the time of the interrogation. When
the interrogation authorized by the stop and
frisk statutes is conducted at the point of the
stop, the suspect has neither been taken into custody nor deprived of his freedom in any significant
way. When questioning at the point of the stop,
the officer is usually not attempting to elicit a
confession from the suspect. The officer's purpose
is to investigate a suspicious situation and is
therefore a general inquiry only. Thus the stop
and the questioning which takes place at the
point of the stop clearly falls outside the category
which the Court would consider "custodial."
Once again quoting the Court regarding general
questioning, "[in such situations the compelling
atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody
interrogation is not necessarily present." -6
The stop and interrogation authorized by the
New York stop and frisk law does not fall into
the category of custodial interrogations and therefore is constitutional.
The Uniform Arrest Act should also meet the
test of the Miranda decision if subsection (3)
of Section 2 authorizing a detention of up to two
hours is removed.57 A two hour detention will
most assuredly be considered a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom. Also a two hour
detention will usually take place at the station
house and would therefore come within the specific
holding of the Court.Y
CONCLUSION
The stop and frisk statutes are a necessary
element of crime prevention. The ability to stop
and frisk a person on grounds of reasonable suspicion will aid the police in apprehending those
committing crimes and will aid in preventing
many crimes from being committed. The officer
no longer has to wait until a crime has been committed in order to stop and question a suspect.
Under the statutes, if it appears that a crime
may he attempted, the officer has the authority
to stop and question the suspect. If the officer
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual
is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody
at the station..." p. 1629.
56Miranda v. Arizona, supra n. 52, at 1629.
57See n. 10.
5sSee n.53.

finds a weapon or if the suspect's answers are
inadequate, further police action is justified and a
crime may be prevented; while under the same
circumstances, but without a stop and frisk statute,
a crime might have been committed because of
the officer's inability to stop and question the
suspect
Even if the suspect is, in reality, a criminal
intent upon committing a crime, but his explanations dismiss the officer's suspicion, it is highly
doubtful that even the coolest of criminals would
attempt a crime soon after the stop. During the
stop the officer obtains the name and address of
the suspect. If a crime is committed subsequent
to this stop and the perpetrator of the crime fits
the description of the person stopped, the officer
knows just where he can find a suspect who may
have committed the crime. Therefore, many crimes
may be prevented from ever occurring and many
crimes which do occur can be solved quickly and
efficiently because of the stop and frisk statutes.59
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately strikes
down the frisk incident to the stop as unconstitutional because it is not based on probable cause,
"[t]he realities of life will demand that an officer
will in fact always frisk a suspect if he fears for
his life, regardless of the Constitution." 60This
is not a malicious defiance of the Constitution
or the Court. The officer will frisk only because
he has no other alternative. The officer is given
the power to stop all suspicious persons, many of
whom are dangerous and carry dangerous weapons.
The officer will necessarily frisk in order to protect himself during the period of the stop. Without this power the officer subjects himself to a
high degree of risk of injury by a suspect who is
carrying a weapon and who is not afraid to use
it against a police officer. In order to encourage
our police officers to do their job properly, the
power to frisk has to follow the power to stop."
Even if evidence obtained from the frisk is
59Based on an interview with Detective Thomas
%1cCannof the Chicago Police Dept. Detective 'McCann
is presently in the license division of the force, but was
formerly in the sex offenses division of the force.
61Schoenfeld, supra n. 32, at 633.
61Justice Schaefer suggests that a search should be
allowed incidental to a stop when the officer believes he
is in danger, but anything found during the search be
excluded from evidence. This solution allows "[tihe
search... to perform its authorized function of protecting the officer, but it could not serve the more questionable function of securing evidence against the
suspect."

